In a rented room in Kota, Rajasthan, a seventeen-year-old from Patna is awake at midnight, studying for the Joint Entrance Examination, the brutally competitive test that is the gateway to India’s elite Indian Institutes of Technology. He has been here eleven months. His parents, a government clerk father and a schoolteacher mother, took out a loan to send him here. The coaching institute charges more than the father earns in a year. On the wall above the desk, the teenager has taped a printout. Not a motivational quote or a photograph of his family. But instead a photograph of the IIT Bombay campus. He has never been to Mumbai.
This is not an unusual story. In many ways, it is the story of modern India. The conviction that technology is the most reliable path upward has proved remarkably resistant to contrary evidence, held so firmly it has outlasted the layoffs, the AI disruption, and every data point that complicates it. To understand why, you have to understand that the dream was never really about technology.

The Architecture of an Aspiration
It begins with Jawaharlal Nehru.
After Independence, India’s first prime minister was explicit about what engineers were for. Speaking at the very first convocation of IIT Kharagpur in 1951, Nehru described the new institute as a “fine monument of India, representing India’s urges, India’s future in the making.” He had modeled the IITs on MIT after a visit in 1949, and envisioned them as the cornerstone of a post-colonial nation proving itself through technology. Engineering was not a career choice. It was civic participation.
That idea calcified into culture. Nearly 47 percent of Indian students aspire to become engineers. The phrase mera beta engineer banega (“my son will become an engineer”) is so embedded in the cultural lexicon that it functions simultaneously as a parental dream, social pressure, and a national cliché. The 2009 Bollywood film 3 Idiots, which remains one of the highest-grossing Indian films ever made, is a firm condemnation of a contemporary education system criticized for its constrictive and stressful nature, one blamed for increasing student suicides. The film also became a sensation in China, where its portrayal of educational pressure resonated deeply with audiences. The film’s most devastating joke is a throwaway line where a pregnant woman muses that her child will inevitably be either a doctor or an engineer, depending, naturally, on the child’s gender. Seventeen years on, people still quote it. The system it critiques is still largely intact.

The reason is not irrationality. It is history.
The parents who pushed their children toward engineering in the 1990s and 2000s were making a rational bet. IT was one of the very few sectors in India offering global-scale salaries, relative job security, and a clear path into the middle class. Those bets paid off. A generation of engineers bought apartments, educated their children, and became the social proof that their communities needed to believe the path was real. The inheritance of ambition is not irrational. It is, in fact, quite a logical response to living memory of what worked.
But those children, the generation now entering the workforce, are inheriting ambitions formed under different conditions. The world they are entering has AI rewriting job descriptions in real time, a tech sector that lays off thousands in a quarter and hires them back the next, and an H-1B pathway to America that is politically contested in ways it never was before.
The Numbers the Dream Ignores
2025 was one of the most turbulent years in India’s technology sector. Tata Consultancy Services cut nearly 12,000 employees. Startups shed an estimated 20,000 to 25,000 jobs. Surveys show that 67 percent of engineers fear AI will take their roles, and that 60 percent of engineering graduates are considered unemployable by industry standards. The Aspiring Minds assessment found that only around 10 percent of Indian IT graduates can write code that a machine can actually execute.
That last number requires a pause. India produces hundreds of thousands of engineering graduates every year. The coaching industry that funnels students toward the IITs generates approximately ₹6,500 crore in annual revenue. Kota alone hosts over 250,000 students at its peak, in a city whose entire economy is built on exam preparation. And yet, a comprehensive skills assessment found that fewer than one in ten of the graduates this system produces can do basic programming.
What the system has actually created, then, is a two-tier reality. At the very top, the IITs, the NITs, the handful of elite institutions, it produces engineers of genuine global caliber. Of the roughly one million students who appear for the JEE each year, only around 10,000 are admitted to the 23 IITs. That is one percent. Below that narrow apex lies an enormous second tier. Millions of students who attended engineering college, earned the credential, and emerged without the skills the said credential was supposed to signify. The dream is real at the top. At scale, it is largely a sorting factory.
Even so, Kota’s enrollment bounced back in 2026, with coaching centers reporting 20 to 30 percent increases in admissions after a dip in 2023 and 2024. The dream, it turns out, is not particularly interested in the news cycle.
What the IIT Produces (What It Doesn’t)
The deepest irony of India’s tech obsession lies in the gap between what the IIT represents and what it actually delivers to the country.
Consider the diaspora. Indians account for approximately 71 percent of all H-1B visas issued in the United States. That is 2,83,000 in fiscal year 2024 alone, compared to 47,000 for the next-highest country, China. This is a structural dominance of a specific pipeline. The rise of the Indian tech diaspora was not simply a story of individual achievement. It coincided with a period when America’s expanding software industry was actively recruiting technical talent. From the Y2K era through the dot-com boom and beyond, the H-1B visa became a key pathway into that workforce. Indian engineers became one of the largest beneficiaries of that demand.
Today, Sundar Pichai leads Alphabet, Satya Nadella leads Microsoft, Arvind Krishna leads IBM, and Shantanu Narayen leads Adobe. The roster of Indian-origin CEOs at the apex of American technology reads like a convocation list.
These figures function in India less as biographies than as parables. They are held up not as exceptions but as proofs of concept. They signal that the system works, the path is real, and the visa is the threshold. What is less visible in that telling is the scaffolding behind each success, the years in Kota, the family loans, the millions who sat the same exam and did not make it. Over time, what began as a labor pipeline evolved into something more powerful in the Indian imagination. It became evidence that the path worked.
And then there are the harder questions the parables just don’t answer. India produces the CEOs of the world’s most powerful technology companies, but not the companies themselves. India spends 0.65 percent of its GDP on research and development, compared to 2.4 percent in China and 3.5 percent in the United States. One analysis put it plainly, ‘India’s IT industry was built to deliver software services, not to invent.’ TCS, Infosys, and Wipro, the companies that helped create that demand for engineers in India and effectively built the Indian middle class, turned Bengaluru into a global destination. But they were made for execution, not origination. They scaled what worked. They delivered what clients asked for. They optimized. They did not, for the most part, create.
This is a direct consequence of the same cultural logic that fills Kota every year. The system that rewards exam performance over curiosity, credential over risk, and stability over failure is the same system that produces brilliant executives for other people’s companies while struggling to produce a Nvidia of its own. Liberalization opened markets, and the fastest path to growth lay in services. As one analysis observed, ‘frontier technology asks for long horizons and uncertain payoffs. It demands that money be spent before results are visible and that failure be accepted not as an aberration but as a necessary stage.’ That is beginning to change. In India’s major cities, startup failure is increasingly treated as a rite of passage rather than a source of shame. Founders now publicly announce closures, return investor money, and move on in ways that would have been unthinkable a decade ago. But a founder from Benaras tells us, “In Tier-II and Tier-III cities, the stigma still exists. It’s not as bad as it once was, but it’s there. The cultural permission to fail productively has not yet reached us. But the truth is you cannot build an Apple or a Nvidia or an OpenAI without it.”
Why Has AI Disruption Not Changed the Math?
Nearly 64 percent of Indian IT firms integrated generative AI tools in 2025. One report estimates that 640,000 low-skilled service jobs in the sector are at risk from automation, while only 160,000 mid- to high-skilled positions will be created to replace them. The math is not encouraging. The sector that has historically absorbed India’s engineering graduates is slowly reducing its need for exactly the kind of engineers the coaching industry mass-produces each year.
And yet the NASSCOM numbers reveal something counterintuitive. Direct tech sector employment is projected to reach approximately 6 million in fiscal year 2026, up 2.3 percent, with a net addition of 135,000 employees. Even in a year of structural disruption and high-profile layoffs, the industry added jobs. The sector is simultaneously contracting in some roles and expanding in others, a volatility that looks, at least from the outside, like chaos, but which, over time, still trends upward.
Perhaps that is the fact that keeps the dream alive. On aggregate, tech keeps winning. It does not win for everyone, and the cost in wasted potential, family debt, and in the most devastating cases, student lives, is enormous. But the aggregate keeps trending upward, and aspiration, once it becomes cultural and braided into identity, does not respond to individual tragedies. It responds to the aggregate.
What This Has to Do With The US
Americans are living through their own version of this story. A generation raised to believe that college was the reliable ladder has discovered that the ladder has become very expensive and leads to a labor market that no longer reliably rewards what it once did. The disruption is one American workers are anxiously tracking. AI replacing roles, the hollowing out of middle-skill jobs, and the sense that credential and effort no longer produce stability are all also already inside India’s tech sector. It’s just further along.
What India offers, then, is a story about itself. But zoom out and it is also an early preview. The question of what happens when a society’s most powerful aspiration outpaces its economy’s ability to fulfill that aspiration. Then, it is not uniquely Indian. It is merely more visible there, more extreme, more accelerated.

No Clean Answers
Back in the room in Kota, the teenager with the IIT Bombay printout knows, on some level, the contradictions of the world he is trying to enter. The dream is not delusional. India’s tech sector expanded from $118 billion in revenue in 2015 to an estimated $283 billion in 2025. The engineers who left for Silicon Valley and now write the next chapter of AI are not inventions. The path is real, even if it is narrow.
The problem is not that the dream is false. It is that the dream has been scaled to serve far more people than it can accommodate. And the machinery for managing that gap, the cultural permission to try something else, to redefine success, to fail without shame, and perhaps most urgently, to build something that the world has never seen before rather than execute what others have already imagined, is still catching up.
Until it does, the lights stay on in Kota. The printout stays on the wall.



















